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will again become an integrated oil company and through its subsidiaries will be so
situated that it can be in constant competition with Indiana subsidiaries. Indiana,
however, may continue to elect a majority of the board of Pan American. Under such
circumstances real competition between the parent and its seventy-eight per cent-
owned subsidiary is as unlikely as that the Indiana directors on the Pan American
board could completely divorce themselves from considerations of Indiana's welfare
in situations in which the interests of the two corporations conflict. In virtually ad-
mitting that the Indiana-controlled directors on Pan American cannot be disinter-
ested, 8 the court furnishes a sufficient answer to any argument that the relief granted
is adequate."
Corporations-Sale of Controlling Minority Interest under Questionable Circum-
stances-[Federal].-The plaintiff, an incorporated investment trust, had been in the
control of a group of minority shareholders who had solicited proxies and secured the
election of their candidates as directors. This controlling group sold their stock in a
block to a syndicate. When the control had been transferred, the directors in office suc-
cessively resigned within a period of a few minutes, and after each resignation the re-
maining directors elected to office a member of, or an individual "suggested" by, the
syndicate. Immediately afterwards, the syndicate, all the members of which became
directors, systematically looted the corporation's assets by substituting worthless se-
curities for valuable ones. Subsequently a new board of directors was elected. In an
action by the corporation against members of the original controlling group and the
directors who had relinquished control to the syndicate, held, that "the owners of con-
trol are under a duty not to transfer it to outsiders if the circumstances surrounding
the proposed transfer are such as to awaken suspicion, and put a prudent man on
28 174 Misc. 6ox, 662, 664, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 65i, 709, 711 (S. Ct. 1940).
9 An appeal in the principal case has been filed in the appellate division. The plaintiffs
have filed a cross-appeal from that portion of the judgment refusing to grant permanent relief
as asked for in the complaint. It is not without significance that Pan American is proceeding
with construction of a pipe line from the East Texas field to its refineries on the Gulf. Standard
Corporation Records, Guide and Index Section, November 28, i94o, p. io, and Chicago Daily
News, col. 4, p- 45 (Dec. 13, 194o).
x The suspicious circumstances were: the agreement to have a large part of the corporation's
assets converted into cash and available as such at the time of the sale; the several warnings
to the defendant director by counsel of the corporation of the danger of dealing with little-
known parties; the fact that the same corporation had been looted by another group five years
before which should have been a vivid reminder of the dangers to which these investment
trusts were subject; the presence of a director whose questionable ethical standard was well-
known; and the inflated price paid.
The payment of an inflated price is not of itself a suspicious circumstance, for a controlling
group may receive a higher than market price by virtue of its strategic position, and the buyer
may desire control for an honest business reason (cf. Stanton v. Schenck, 140 Misc. 621, 251
N.Y. Supp. 221 (S. Ct. 193 i) where control of Loew's Theaters, Inc. was passed to Fox Theaters,
Inc.). But an investment trust, whose assets are but the ready equivalent of cash, cannot give
the opportunities of a commercial or industrial venture unless it holds stocks of a nature pe-
culiarly desirable to the purchaser. In the absence of knowledge of this fact, the payment of
a price equivalent to several times the market value of the stock is a circumstance which
should put a reasonable man on his guard.
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guard." judgment for the plaintiff generally with further proceedings ordered for pur-
poses of assessing damages. Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp.2
It is usually said that a stockholder, including a majority stockholder, owes no
fiduciary duty to the corporation or to other stockholders. Thus a shareholder is not
subject to the disabilities of a director in dealing with the corporation or its sharehold-
ers and may deal at arm's length in transactions involving the purchase or sale of assets
or securities of the corporation.3 But in certain situations, a stockholder, usually a
majority shareholder, may be held to the same standard of conduct as is required of a
director. Where the shareholder actually controls the corporation, through dummy di-
rectors, the court may look beyond the corporate set-up and treat the stockholder as a
director.4 Thus, in holding the minority stockholders to a similar standard of conduct,
the court in the instant case emphasized that the transaction was "a sale of control, to
which the stock sale was requisite, but nevertheless a secondary matter."s
In previous cases where a controlling shareholder not on the board of directors has
been treated somewhat as a fiduciary, the litigation has involved dealings between the
shareholder and the corporation, rather than a sale by the shareholder of his stock and
his control.6 But, although no cases have resolved the problem, there are dicta that a
majority shareholder cannot sell out to one--such as a competitor-whom he reason-
ably should suspect of intending to ruin the corporation.7 Whether the majority share-
holder actually controls the management of the corporation at the time of the sale is
apparently of little importance here, since the purchaser automatically obtains ulti-
mate control and can eventually succeed in his purpose by electing a subservient board
of directors. On the other hand, where the controlling shareholder owns only a minor-
ity of shares, sale of his stock does not result in passing control to the purchaser in the
absence of an agreement between the seller and the reigning board of directors and the
purchaser. If there is no such agreement, the rights of the other (majority) share-
holders are not so likely to be prejudiced by the sale for they will commonly be able to
prevent that change in the directorate which would permit the purchaser to loot the
corporation. But where there is an agreement to pass control, as in the instant case,
the seller of minority shares should be on guard to protect the other shareholders and
235 F. Supp. 22 (Pa. 1940).
3Rothchild v. Memphis & C. R. Co., 113 Fed. 476 (C.C.A. 6th 1902).
4 Ervin v. Oregon R. & Nay. Co., 27 Fed. 625 (C.C. N.Y. 1886); see Kavanaugh v. Kava-
naugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 195, 123 N.E. x48, 151 (i919); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
v. New York & N.R. Co., i5o N.Y. 410, 434, 44 N.E. io43, io5o (i896); Southern Pacific
Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 (I919); Edwards v. Plains Light & Water Co., 49 Mont. 535,
547, 143 Pac. 962, 965 (1914); Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 99, 25 N.E.
201, 202 (X89o); 13 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § s8i (perm. ed. 1932).
s Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 24 (Pa. i94o).
6Wheeler v. Abilene Nat'l Bank Bldg. Co., 159 Fed. 391 (C.C.A. 8th 1908); Meeker v.
Winthrop Iron Co., i7 Fed. 48 (C.C. Mich. 1883); Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 221
Fed. 529 (C.C.A. 6th 1915); 13 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 58io (perm. ed. 1932).
7 See Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 7 Atl. 368, 373 (Pa. i886); Southern Pacific
Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (i919); Hunnewell v. New York Central & H.R.R. Co., 196 Fed.
543 (C.C. N.Y. 1911); Farmers' Loan &Trust Co. v. New York & N.R. Co., i5o N.Y. 410,44
N.E. 1043 (1896).
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the corporation, for the purchaser can use his control to deplete the corporate assets
before the next election of directors.8
Assuming that under certain conditions a stockholder must exercise care in dispos-
ing of his shares, what is the extent of that duty? The court in the instant case hesi-
tated to attempt "any general definition," but laid down a rule no broader than that
necessitated by the particular facts: Where "circumstances surrounding the proposed
transfer are such as to awaken suspicion" the seller is under a duty not to transfer "un-
less a reasonably adequate investigation discloses such facts as would convince a rea-
sonable person that no fraud is intended or likely to result."9 A fortiori, actual knowl-
edge of the purchaser's destructive intent would result in holding the seller liable.1o
The reluctance of the court to state that the seller has a positive duty of investigating
the purchaser is perhaps partly explained by the considerations that corporate shares
are treated by the commercial world as freely alienable, and that imposition of such a
duty appears to go beyond the assumption of risk that is commonly attributed to large
-even majority--shareholders. But it may be questioned whether these considera-
tions should be of weight where the stockholder is being treated by the court primarily
as a corporate manager rather than as an investor.
In the instant case, the controlling stockholders did not deal directly with the pur-
chasers, but the negotiations were carried on by the board of directors. The court,
having stated that one of the director-defendants was in fact agent for all of the con-
trolling shareholders before the court, imputed the knowledge of suspicious circum-
stances possessed by the agent to his principals, who were held for their negligence in
failing to investigate these circumstances. 2
The court did not discuss what circumstances are necessary to establish an agency
relationship in this situation, but it appears that the court thought that an agency ex-
ists whenever a director is completely subservient to a shareholder.' 3 This view leads
s While the method of changing the directorate used in the instant case is very common,
Bosworth v. Allen, i68 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E. 163 (igoi); Oil Shares, Inc. v. Kahn, 94 F. (2d) 751
(C.C.A. 3d i938), rev'd on other grounds 304 U.S. 551 (1938), the seriousness of the action is
not excused on the plea that it is a normal incident to a sale of controlling stock.
9 Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 25 (Pa. 1940).
'o If the court were to require actual knowledge of the purchaser's intent before holding
the seller liable, the burden of proof would seemingly be placed upon the plaintiff. It may well
be that the desire to make the cause of action of more than doubtful benefit impelled the court
to adopt the more liberal view in the instant case.
x, Reconsideration of Share Certificate Negotiability, 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 497 (1940).
"2The court was highly impressed with the fact that "the banks, with all their credit facili-
ties made absolutely no investigation of the financial standing and resources of the purchasers
and at no time received any information to indicate to them that the purchasers had any money
whatever." Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 27
(Pa. 1940).
'sThe assumption of the court raises the question of the liability of interest groups who have
a "representative" on the board of directors. It is suggested that the question may be decided
on the basis of the shareholding-interest group's motive in exercising control. In particular,
"With the investment trust occupying a unique place in the financial world today ... there
is increasing danger of selling out for the purpose of making profit on shares." Lattin, Equi-
table Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Majority Stockholders, 3oMich.L.
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to a sound result, for a shareholder who controls a corporation from behind the scenes
through a dummy directorate should be subject to the same disabilities as one who ex-
ercises his control while on the board of directors.'4
The court in the present case suggests that damages are to be measured by the in-
jury resulting to the corporation from the shortcomings of the controlling stockholders.
Since only a fraction of the controlling stockholders were actually before the court, a
question arises as to whether full damages can be recovered from those defendants.
Because recovery was based upon breach of fiduciary duty by the entire controlling
group, it would appear that the individual defendant is to be treated as one of several
joint tort-feasors who are jointly and severally liable."s It should be noted, however,
that the court, while holding the defendants for negligent omissions, dismissed the
charge of "knowingly participating in a fraudulent conspiracy" as "not established by
the evidence."' 6 It is possible that in the absence of a conspiracy, the several defend-
ants could be treated as co-promoters who have divided a wrongful profit, in which sit-
uation it is sometimes held that each promoter is liable only for his share of the profit. 7
But this result appears unwarranted in the instant case, since the action was based
upon the total injury to the corporation and was not limited to a recovery of the unjust
profits-presumably measured by the excess of purchase price over the market price-
received by the controlling shareholders.
Criminal Law-Accessory after the Fact-Misprision of Felony-[Michigan].-
The defendant, knowing a felony had been committed, failed to notify the police or to
do anything toward the apprehension and bringing to justice of the guilty person. An
information, which resulted in a conviction, was filed charging him with the common
law crime of misprision of felony. On an appeal from an order denying leave to with-
draw a plea of guilty, held, that mere non-disclosure of knowledge of a felony com-
mitted by another is not a crime; the conduct of the accused must be such as to make
him an accessory after the fact. Misprision of felony, short of accessory after the fact,
Rev. 645, 659 (1932). And the imputation of a "representative's" knowledge to the interest
group he represents does not seem to be too harsh.
X4 "Control" may be exercised by an officer of the corporation (Field v. Western Life In-
demnity Co., i66 Fed. 607 (C.C. Ill. ioo8); Westwood v. Continental Can Co., 8o F. (2d) 494
(C.C.A. 5th 1935)) as well as by the directors (McClure v. Law, i6 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388
(1899); Keystone Guard v. Beaman, 264 Pa. 397, 107 Atl. 835 (i919); Robotham v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 673, 53 Atl. 842 (1903); see Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586 (1921)).
15 It may be pointed out that the question of whether this "quasi-fiduciary" duty of the
controlling group is based upon a trust, contract, or tort relationship is undecided, although
the court, in the instant case, assumes that the defendants are joint tort-feasors. The problem
of whether contribution over would be allowed, and if so, the problem of apportionment, may
possibly be based upon the court's assumption of the underlying relationship between the
shareholders of a corporation. See Harper, Torts § 303 (1933); 2 Williston, Contracts § 345
(1936); Rest., Trusts § 258 (1935).
z6 Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 28 (Pa. 194o).
27 Measure of Recovery against a Promoter Who Sells Property to a Corporation in Breach
of Fiduciary Duty, 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 534 (1940).
